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Abstract
Studies on election and its consequences on political parties in new democratic countries have often 
paid attention to cover the impacts imposed on the party system. This paper aims to examine the 
extent of the electoral system in influencing political parties in terms of improving their function 
or performance. This study will apply an analytical framework initiated earlier by Webb and 
White (2009) on party dimension in the new democracy by looking at the Indonesian case. In 
this framework, there are several generic factors in the relation between the electoral system and 
the party’s function such as ideological polarization, party constituency base, fractionalization 
in parliament and votes distribution. This study found that any changes applied to the electoral 
system in democratic Indonesia bear little or insignificant impact on political party performance. 
In addition, this study made use of the national election result dataset and calculated the variables 
with correlated formula which were subsequently analyzed to obtain an empirical explanation. 
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Abstrak
Studi mengenai pemilu dan dampaknya terhadap partai politik di negara demokrasi baru banyak memberikan 
perhatian pada sistem kepartaiannya. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk menguji sejauh mana sistem pemilu 
mempengaruhi partai politik dalam meningkatkan fungsi dan performanya. Studi ini mengambil cara 
pandang yang disampaikan oleh Webb dan White (2009) mengenai dimensi kepartaian di negara demokrasi 
baru dengan obyek studi kasus di Indonesia. Pada cara pandang ini, terdapat beberapa faktor laten dalam 
hubungan antara sistem pemilu dan kepartaian terhadap fungsi partai politik seperti polarisasi ideologi, 
basis konstituensi, fraksionalisasi di parlemen dan distribusi suara. Studi ini menemukan bahwa perubahan 
sistem pemilu dalam periode demokrasi menghasilkan sedikit dan dampak yang kurang signifikan terhadap 
performa partai politik. Studi ini menggunakan data hasil pemilu nasional dan menghitungnya dengan 
rumus dan variabel yang menjadi unit analisis untuk mendapatkan eksplanasi empiris. 
Kata Kunci:
pemilu; partai politik; dimensi kepartaian; Indonesia.
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Introduction
In addition to the 1998 Indonesian 
Reformasi, an open political system has given 
political elites, who were previously subjected 
to authoritarian regime pressure, the audacity 
to start actualizing their political existence 
by establishing political parties. As a result, 
since 1999, Indonesia had entered a phase of 
extreme multiparty system which mirrored 
the 1950s situation. Thus, studies conducted on 
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political parties in post-authoritarian Indonesia 
still apply the political ‘stream’ (politik aliran) 
perspective as dominantly occurring within 
the period in addition to analysis of more 
recent situation. Ufen (2004), for example, 
considers how the workings of political stream 
are reconfigured by the military. Nevertheless, 
the political stream, albeit in a different form, 
remains present and has become a part of 
political dynamics during elections. Even in the 
1999 and 2004 elections, some of the supports 
provided by the political parties were still 
characterized by Muslim ideological streams, 
although recent tendencies were relatively weak 
compared to the pattern of political streams in 
the 1955 election (Ratnawati and Haris, 2008). 
Despite further study, Ufen (2006) mentions that 
its significance began to diminish by referring 
to the de-alignment trend indicated by the rise 
of ‘presidentialized’ parties and growing intra-
party authoritarianism. Mietzner’s study (2007) 
also shows the new direction of party activism 
by saying that the pattern of party financing 
has transformed parties into rent seekers which 
subsequently resulted in low internal coherence 
to the general democratic agenda.
One factor regarding party leadership 
and identification is particularly interesting in 
acquiring more attention during the Indonesian 
transition period. Analyses of the 1999 and 
2004 elections revealed several interesting 
findings. For example, factors such as voters’ 
public perception on leadership and party 
identification remain significant in comparison 
to other variables such as religious orientation 
and political economy (Liddle & Mujani, 
2007). Liddle and Mujani’s study shows that 
the leadership aspect remains dominant in 
the majority of political parties in Indonesia, 
so the general characteristics of the parties are 
consequently shaped by the parties’ leading 
figures. A significant question that could be 
further inquired is how this relates to the 
performance of the parties. Several studies 
on political parties in Indonesia have been 
conducted since 1998 to address this issue. 
For instance, studies conducted by Tan (2006) 
examine the performance of the parties in the 
period of seven years after 1998. She found that 
the party and the party system show strengths 
and weaknesses in relation to legitimacy. 
Furthermore, the institutionalization of the 
party is still weak, due to strong personal 
figures in the election, pointing toward either 
the president or the head of local governments. 
Nevertheless, in terms of accountability, the 
election system progressively allows voters to 
apply the reward and punishment mechanism 
to the parties and political leaders. Despite 
what other studies mention, political parties 
in Indonesia remain more institutionalized 
than those in the Philippines and Thailand, 
where interparty competition is more stable 
(Ufen, 2008).
Regarding the performance of parties, 
Mietzner (2013) provides an illustration on 
the relationship between money and ideology 
in political parties in Indonesia. Mietzner 
questioned previous studies mentioning that 
Indonesian political parties are allegedly 
dysfunctional and poor in management. 
Based on this conclusion, he suggests that 
the contribution of previous studies in the 
consolidation of a democratic system is 
questionable. He found little empirical evidence 
of cartel party, wherein parties in Indonesia 
are far from adopting cartel characteristics in 
their organization, and the level of intra-party 
competition is still shaped by ideology.
Upon reviewing relevant literature on 
parties condition in democratic Indonesia 
and being inspired by Hellman’s study (2011), 
Mietzner notes that democratization can 
generate political change and new electoral 
system. Thus, it can trigger the proliferation of 
new political parties, despite not having strong 
justifications of their programs and strategies. 
Moreover, his argument explicitly focuses on 
the empirical fact that politicians continuously 
utilize political parties as political vehicles 
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and mobilize them when necessary during 
elections. Therefore, the aims of the parties are 
merely to serve the political ambitions of the 
party elites.
The political parties in Indonesia were 
established by the supremacy of political elites as 
the fulfillment of their personal ambitions or the 
ambitions of their respective oligarchs. From the 
onset of the 1998 reform, a party was generally 
established based on ideological basis. The 
programs and strategies of a party are regarded 
as mere requisites at the formal level and tend 
to be solely left as written documents. It is only 
considered at the formal level as it is the initial 
requirement for the election registration. This is 
then followed by organizational development, 
which includes elite composition, governance 
structure and shaping the organization’s political 
culture. The process of developing bases for social 
and political constituency mainly takes place 
during electoral campaign. This pattern explains 
the phenomenon of the proliferation of political 
parties and political elites in Indonesia: it is easy 
to set up a party simply because it is a vehicle in 
an election.
Meanwhile, the electoral system has been 
changed time after time in order to provide 
quality election result, especially to improve 
party performance. Studies have shown that 
the electoral system has political consequences 
in which it  shapes the dynamics of political 
parties and party system, it also has an effect 
on the number of parties in election and 
parliament (Bogdanor and Butler, eds, 1983, 
Grofman and Lijphart, eds, 1986). Several 
variables measured as the impact of electoral 
laws mainly focus on votes convert, electoral 
formula, degree of proportionality (Gallagher, 
1991), or representativeness, fragmentation 
of party and district magnitudes (Rae, 1967, 
Sartori, 1968, Taagepera, 1999, Cox, 1997). 
This article starts by questioning to what 
extent has the electoral system influenced 
the party system and its performance in 
democratic Indonesia? The aim of this article 
is to explain the relationship between the 
electoral system and political parties and party 
system dynamics from their performance in 
the election up to the parliament. This study 
employs analytical framework on party 
dimension in emerging democracies and 
applies quantitative data analysis to prove the 
empirical findings. This exploration will consist 
of three issues, namely: capturing electoral 
system change including electoral law and 
its different procedures, explaining results on 
party dimension variables, and analysis on 
the relationship between election and political 
party dynamics in democratic Indonesia within 
the span of the 1998 to 2014 election.
Analytical Methods: Assessing Party 
Dimension in the New Democracy
The changes in democratization, both 
in the terminology of the third wave of 
democratization or New Democracy, as 
encountered in the study by Webb and White 
(2007), show that political party varies in 
its level of adaptation. As an example, the 
historical stages of party development in 
the first wave of democratization in Western 
Europe, namely the formation of a cadre of 
an elite parliamentary party, socialist-mass 
party, are then transformed into a catch-all 
electoralist party. The establishment of a new 
party in a democratic country shows an explicit 
form of the unique result in democratization. 
This uniqueness derives from the variation of 
authoritarian regime model in power prior 
to democratization. Webb and White (2007) 
use the three party dimensions to evaluate 
the effectiveness of a party system. Firstly, 
they assess the dimensions of party links with 
electorates. In connection with the variable of 
party electorates which focuses on the vibrancy 
and health of linkages between parties and the 
society at large, I will examine the extent of the 
popular legitimacy of political parties, party 
identification, party institutionalization and the 
level of party fragmentation in parliament. 
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The present subsection will examine 
aspects of electoral volatility and explain the 
maps of public support for political parties. 
For this reason, the variables applied in this 
study will be based on data that can be derived 
from electoral volatility, fragmentation of 
the party system, and the effective number 
of party members in parliament (ENPP). 
Secondly, examination of the development 
of party organization is employed to assess 
the strength of party organization. The point 
lies in parties’ capacity to maximize existing 
resources to optimize the achievement of 
their objectives. The variables included in 
the analysis are party finances, party staffing 
and party memberships. I observe variations 
in the context of party organization, which 
contribute to party effectiveness in carrying 
out functions optimally in the realm of central 
and public office and in work on the ground. 
When assessing the level of party organization, 
Ishiyama (1999) adopts basic indicator of the 
importance of membership in the party and the 
degree of coherence of party ideology. 
In analyzing the development of party 
organizations in Indonesia, examining the 
degree of ideological coherence became 
difficult due to three factors. The first factor 
is the bias issue of ideology internalization 
within the party. In addition, there is no party 
capable of maintaining consistency between 
the conceptualization of ideology and the 
formulation of the party platform to the level of 
policy implementation. Secondly, the form and 
format of inter-party coalition in parliament are 
based on public pressure to balance the interests 
of the placement of party cadres in executive 
government posts. The format of the coalition 
in a stable executive government needs the 
support of at least three quarters of votes in 
parliament. Thirdly, weak party identification is 
positively correlated with party backing. Socio-
political cleavage of constituent parties does not 
have the benefit of good aggregation process. 
As a result, there is notable vulnerability in the 
articulation of the elite’s interests and grassroots 
supporters, which causes separation within the 
party elite. In using the second variable, the 
goal is to reveal how strong the existing party 
organizations are. The third variable is party 
performance, which is the contributing factor 
in the party’s influence in parliament and 
government cohesion.
Electoral System and Political Parties in 
Democratic Indonesia
It is important to describe several 
factors regarding party performances such as 
organization, regulation and impact of party 
system. The model of party organization 
in Indonesia could be categorized into the 
following types. This analysis significantly 
notes that the corporatism model is less 
common in Indonesian parties. For example, 
PDI-P and Golkar were categorized as catch-
all parties (Ufen, 2008a). PDI-P became the 
largest party, representing non-Muslims and 
those who were not very religious (LSI, 2008). 
Apart from social and religious cleavages, the 
discussion on political parties is inseparable 
from the regional spectrum between centre 
and periphery in the distribution of votes in 
the local party (Ananta et al., 2005). Golkar 
became the controlling party by having strong 
infrastructure outside of Java, as opposed to 
either PKB in East Java or PDI-P in Central Java 
(Mujani & Liddle, 2007). Although the basis 
of the parties could be mapped, the post-New 
Order elections have shown the dynamics 
and shifting support of parties. For example, 
in the 2004 and 2009 Elections, Golkar lost a 
significant number of votes in Sulawesi and 
Sumatra due to the presence of new parties 
established during the Reformasi period. A high 
level of competition to reach the constituents 
also occurred between PKB and PDI-P in 
East Java. The 1999 elections resulted in as 
many as sixty-five percent of Parliamentary 
Members originating from the Golkar Party and 
approximately 55.3 percent of PPP inheriting 
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their positions from the party’s constituency 
based under the New Order (King, 2003).
There are four laws that have been 
regulating political parties since 1998, namely 
Law No. 2 of 1999, Law No. 31 of 2002, 
Act No. 2 of 2008 and Act No. 2 of 2011 
on the amendment of Law No. 2 of 2008. 
All of these regulations are intended to 
create an organized political party which is 
capable of managing a clear constituency base, 
enabling the aggregation structure and being 
organizationally accountable in range of human 
resources to self-financing. The implementation 
of the laws is limited to administrative and 
technical matters which are intended to be 
less influential on the formation of the party 
system and significantly improve the quality 
of the party. In fact, quite the opposite had 
occurred and de-institutionalization of the 
party system increased. A party less rooted in 
the community and its constituents resulted 
in the widening gap between the party vote 
in the elections and the presidential election 
of 2004 (Tomsa & Ufen, 2013). The structure of 
parties was weak and dominated by high levels 
of personal leadership. The party machine did 
not work effectively and it had low internal 
discipline. Institutionally, the party was not 
well established at the bottom level of the 
management board. The cases of direct local 
elections since 2005 show that the acceleration 
of the relationship between candidates and 
political parties is increasingly slow and the 
social barrier is blurred (Pratikno in Erb & 
Sulistiyanto, eds, 2009).
The party system after the reform was 
influenced by the level of competition between 
the parties and the impact of the electoral law. 
Mietzner (2008) argues that the post-Suharto 
political party system has developed centripetal 
dynamics that have stabilized and perpetuated 
its structures. In his review of the position of the 
political ideology of the parties that competed 
after 1998, he found that most parties are central 
or catch all parties, which use their constituency 
base merely for winning elections. All political 
spectrums of the constituency base have been 
accommodated within the party. He concluded 
that the Indonesian party system was dominated 
by the three main political parties, namely 
Golkar, PDI-P and the Democratic Party. The 
Megawati era of 2001-2004, in which the PDI-P 
emerged, saw a move into the middle, away 
from populist and nationalist views, flowing 
from policy, economic, and international 
relations considerations. Pragmatism was 
needed to keep the wheels of the government 
properly turning.
The identification and mapping of the 
post-1999 parties based on ideology are more 
complex. Many of the currently existing parties 
had emerged by this time and had a variety 
of party principles. Formally, ideological 
categorization, which refers to the ideology 
contained in the party constitution (Anggaran 
Dasar/Anggaran Rumah Tangga, AD/ART, 
Articles of Association/By-laws), is limited 
because it does not show the characteristics 
of the parties’ ideological formulation. Some 
parties clearly stated that they adopt Pancasila 
as their ideology, but in reality they represented 
more Muslim voters and advocated programs 
based on their Islamic platforms. The elites of 
these parties also had religious background 
and garnered the favor of Islamic groups. As an 
example, the National Awakening Party (PKB) 
was founded by Abdurrahman Wahid who had 
a background as the former Chairman of the 
Central Board of NU (Liddle, 2000). Similarly, 
the National Mandate Party (PAN) was founded 
by Amien Rais who is the former chairman of 
Muhammadiyah (Mietzner, 2001).
In the 1999 election there were forty-eight 
political parties. Ten political parties formally 
used Islam as a platform, namely: the Justice 
Party (PK), the Indonesian Muslim Awakening 
Party (KAMI), the Party of Muslims (PUI), the 
New Masjumi Party, the United Development 
Party (PPP), The Indonesian Islamic Union 
Party (PSII), the Indonesian Islamic Union 
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Party 1905 (PSII 1905), the Islamic Political 
Party of Indonesia (Masjumi), the Crescent Star 
Party (PBB), and what is now the Indonesian 
Justice and Unity Party (PKPP, formerly the 
Justice and Unity Party). Two parties were 
based on Pancasila and Islam, the Nahdlatul 
Ummah Party (PNU) and the People’s National 
Awakening Party (PKU).1 The rest were parties 
with Pancasila as their ideology. A striking party 
which had a different ideology in 1999 was the 
People’s Democratic Party (PRD), which had 
a popular social-democratic ideology (Profil 
Partai, 1999). Most parties were not explicitly 
ideological in their public trajectories, which 
was part of their strategy to obtain constituents. 
Parties positioned themselves as nationalists, 
as pro-Pancasila, or simultaneously combined 
the two ideologies in an attempt to secure 
widespread support. This was a strategic 
response from the parties upon observation that 
typical voters were no longer enthusiastic about 
ideology. PKS, for example, at the beginning 
of its establishment, was one of the parties 
1 In the 2009 election, open list PR system which 
stipulated in Law No. 10 of 2008 had amended. The 
Constitutional Court issued a verdict No. 22-24 / PUU-
VI / 2008 which establishes an open list PR system with 
majority voting sequence (Urutan Suara Terbanyak). In 
that verdict, the Court abolished the threshold of 30 
percent of the number of voter divider (Bilangan Pembagi 
Pemilih).
that called for the enforcement of Islamic law 
(Shihab & Nugroho, 2008). However, in the 2004 
and 2009 elections PKS labelled itself as an anti-
corruption party (Homayotsu, 2011; Machmudi, 
2008). In fact, their electoral campaign featured 
offerings and expressions that are less Islamic, 
and more popular instead, such as featuring 
the punk community. The Democratic Party, 
at the beginning of its appearance in 2004, 
positioned itself as a nationalist-religious party. 
This trend was also followed by PDI-P and 
Golkar, which no longer positioned themselves 
purely as nationalist-secular parties, but rather 
as religious nationalist parties. This strategy 
continued until the 2009 Election. Eight of the 
nine parties, except PPP which had a seat in the 
DPR, could be classified as catch-all parties.
In Table 1, it can be observed that Indonesia 
post-RReformasi has been implementing an 
electoral law which constantly changed during 
election periods. In general, the Act made 
attempts to establish a simple multi-party 
system wherein only parties having a stable 
constituent can gain seats in parliament. From 
1998 to 2014, eight of the electoral laws can be 
classified into four parts. First, the Act had the 
goal of opening up democratization with the 
participation of political parties as stipulated 
by Law No. 3 of 1999 on General Elections and 
Law No. 4 of 2000 on Amendment Act No. 3 
Table 1. 
Electoral System in Post New Order
Election 
year
Chamber 
Structure
Chamber 
names
Districts
Vote Methods Electoral TresholdNumber Type Size Total seats
1999 Unicameral DPR 26 462 PR-Closed None
Total seats MPR (620) Not elected
2004 (soft) 
Bicameral
DPR 69 3 to 12 550 PR-open 3
DPD 32 4 128 SNTV
MPR Total seats 678
2009 (soft) 
Bicameral
DPR 77 3 to 10 560 PR-open 1(most 
votes sequence)
2,5
DPD 33 4 132 SNTV
MPR Total seats 692
2014 (soft) 
Bicameral
DPR 77 560
DPD 33 132 PR-Open (most 
votes sequence)
3,5
Total seats 692
Source: Compiled by author
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of 1999. In the two laws above, an election is 
still understood as a unicameral legislative 
election in which a president shall be elected 
through Parliament. Second, there are laws that 
strengthen the Indonesian presidential system 
through the separate issuance of laws between 
the legislative and presidential elections. Law 
No. 12 of 2003 has been mentioned explicitly 
as pertaining to the election of parliamentary 
members, and of Provincial and Regent/
Municipality assemblies, while Law No. 23 of 
2003 regulates presidential elections.2
The third part is the expansion of a 
decentralized system by opening up local 
elections directly, and the direct election of 
members of the Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD, 
Regional Representative Council, which is 
similar to the Senate but has no legislative 
authority).3 There are also laws that govern, 
among others, Law No. 32 of 2004 in which 
the direct election of local government is 
included. Law No. 20 of 2004 provides for the 
establishment of Government Regulation No. 
2 of 2004 on the amendment of Law No. 12 of 
2003 on the Election of MPs. Another provision 
is added through Law No. 10 of 2006 on the 
establishment of Government Regulation 
No. 1 of 2006 on the second amendment of 
Act No. 12 of 2003, concerning parliamentary 
elections. Fourth, the Act strengthened the 
presidential system and the simple multi-party 
system. This is stipulated in Law No. 42 of 
2008 concerning presidential elections, Law 
No. 17 of 2009 regarding the establishment 
of Perpu (legislation made by the President 
2 Compiled from www.kpu.go.id with cross-check from 
another official release on national regulation, at: www.
ditjenpp.kemenkumham.go.id
3  Laws that govern, among others, Law No. 32 of 2004 
on which the direct election of local government is 
included. Law No. 20 of 2004 on the establishment 
of Government Regulation No. 2 of 2004, on the 
amendment of Law No. 12 of 2003 on the Election of 
MPs. Another is added through Law No. 10 of 2006 on 
the establishment of Government Regulation No. 1 of 
2006, on the second amendment of Act No. 12 of 2003, 
concerning parliamentary elections.
on matters of urgency), No. 1 of 2009 on the 
amendment of Law No. 10 of 2008 concerning 
the parliamentary elections, Law No. 10 of 2008 
on the legislative elections, and Law No. 8 of 
2012 on parliamentary elections.
In 1999 the electoral system used a PR-
closed list, a system of proportional representation 
in which only active members, party officials, or 
consultants determine the order of candidates. 
This arrangement allowed political parties to 
place strong candidates in the first order of the 
ballot sheet. Of all the issues that emerged as a 
result of the workings of the system, the most 
important is the authority of the dominant 
political party to put forward its candidates and 
ensure their electability. In a “closed list” system, 
the candidates elected are ranked in an order 
determined by the parties (Reynolds, Reilly, & 
Ellis, 2005). Changes in electoral law are related 
to the operational aspects of power distribution 
and parties in parliament (Reilly, 2001). In the 
2009 elections, the system applied an open-list 
PR in the legislative elections. Through this 
arrangement, parties created open space for free 
competition against their candidates (NDI Report, 
1999).4 The relationship between the leadership in 
each party and its candidates was less structured, 
because each candidate was promoted based on 
popularity and strong capital backing is used to 
obtain votes for the party. The party machine 
is no longer dominant in securing candidates’ 
success or otherwise. Open-list PR tended to 
attract candidates seeking to buy influence, 
business connections, and lucrative contracts 
while neglecting the duties of parliamentary 
representation (Hadiz, 2003; Robison & Hadiz, 
2004; Tan, 2002).
4 Some parties had specific reasons for taking advantage 
of the permitted flexibility in the process of determining 
elected candidates. For example, PDI-P was criticized 
during the campaign for nominating a disproportionate 
number of non-Muslim (especially Christian) candidates. 
In response, after the elections PDI-P took advantage 
of the discretion allowed by the KPU and the PPI to 
ensure that a larger share of its elected candidates were 
Muslim
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The 2004 election featured an imposed 2.5 
per cent threshold while concurrently allowing 
an increased number of districts within a 
range of three to ten seats. This is a narrower 
application than the previous one, and parties 
found they had little chance running against 
big parties with an established organizational 
structure at the lower level. There was an 
entry threshold for parties to obtain seats 
in Parliament for nominating a presidential 
candidate. Law 10 of 2008 regulated the amount 
of 20 percent of the seats in the DPR or 25 per 
cent of the national vote, for a party to nominate 
its presidential candidate (Sherlock, 2009). That 
requirement led parties to form coalitions to 
nominate a candidate. In the post-1999 elections 
no party won votes more than 20 percent in the 
national elections. Another significant change 
was the creation of a new legislative body called 
the Dewan Perwakilan Daerah Republik Indonesia 
(DPD, Regional Representative Council of 
the Republic of Indonesia), following the 
amendment of the constitution in 2004. The 
DPD did not have the authority to make laws 
and merely participated in the hearing of the 
DPR. Similarly, the most powerful body prior 
to 2004 was the MPR but it no longer had any 
power, serving only to ceremonially authorize 
and dismiss the President. MPR members are 
comprised of DPR and DPD members. The 
members of DPR amounted to 560 people 
from seventy-seven electoral districts, with 
each province accumulating three to ten seats 
(IDEA Policy Research Paper, 2005), while the 
DPD have 132 elected members, four people 
representing every province with independent 
nomination, and a single system using a non-
transferable vote (SNTV) (IFES, 2014).
Assessing Party Dimension in Indonesia
In this article, index measurements are 
utilized, such as on party system fragmentation 
by using the polarization index Herfindahl 
= ∑ (party seat share in legislature which 
can be interpreted as the probability that 
two deputies picked at random from among 
the legislative parties will be of different 
parties, with higher values indicating a less 
fractionalized party system) (Dalton, 2008). 
Also by using the effective number of parties 
(ENPP) which is calculated as ∑ (party seat 
share in legislature) (Laakso & Taagepera, 
1979) and Rae’s fragmentation measuring party 
number and size or as the proportion of pairs of 
members in a system which contains persons who 
have voted for (or belonged to) different parties in 
the last previous election (Rae, 1968). Another 
mean to measure party strength is by using the 
Pedersen Volatility Index which shows change 
in the share of votes (or seats) per party per 
election (Pedersen, 1979).  
Table 2. 
Variables in Party System 
from 1999-2014 Election
Electoral 
Volatility
Polarization 
(Herfindahl) Fragmentation ENPP
1999 0.212 0.788 5.1
2004 31.22% 0.141 0.859 9.6
2009 32.01% 0.161 0.839 8.6
2014 28.78% 0.123 0.877 8.7
Source: Calculated by author
Volatility results become important in 
view of the stabilization of the party system and 
its level of institutionalization. The factors that 
cause high and low volatility could lie in the 
consolidation of the elites that spin the wheels of 
the party organizations, or external factors, such 
as government being formed or supported by 
poorly performing party. Generally, factors that 
degrade the image of the party in public have 
a direct impact on the emergence of a negative 
campaign against the party (Mair, 1996). From the 
1999 until 2014 election in Indonesia, the highest 
volatility (32.01 percent) was found within the 
period of 2004 to 2009 (Table 2). Moreover, it has 
never declined below 20 percent. This proves that 
there is a serious problem in all the major parties 
regarding the institutionalization of parties and 
party support. 
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The next variable of party polarization 
reflected the dynamics of  intra-party 
competition. Polarization of the parties in the 
1999 elections was high, at 0.212. In comparison 
to the following election, which is within the 
0.123 to 0.161 range, the results of the 1999 
election (in which forty-eight political parties 
took place) were better able to accommodate 
the heterogeneity of political forces. This is 
corroborated with data in 1999 showing that 
the effective number of parties at the electoral 
level (ENPP) adopted a simple multiparty 
system with 5.1 points. Political fragmentation 
in parliament was also at a low of 0.788. 
When the 2004 elections (won by the 
Democratic Party) and the 2009 elections 
(won by Golkar) were examined, with the 
determination of electoral threshold above 
one percent for the national vote, the party 
system was clearly more stable. Volatility 
remained high due to the major parties 
competing for voters that were likely to shift 
their position (swinging voters). Swinging 
voters were predominately individuals with 
higher education degrees living in urban 
areas. On the other hand, polarization and 
fragmentation variables are unlikely to have 
a high discrepancy. Interestingly, several 
phenomena exhibit sharp differences with 
respect to ENPP. In the 2004 elections, ENPP 
achieved 9.6, compared to 8.6 in the 2009 
elections. Following the 2004 elections, many 
new parties were a combination of parties that 
had failed to obtain a seat or gained only a few 
seats in parliament. Thus, the votes of each 
party were relatively stable, but evenly spread 
with additional votes for intermediate parties. 
In general, the party system in Indonesia in 
the post-reform era (or in the four elections 
analyzed here), have an average ENPP of eight 
points, and the system is thus categorized as a 
moderate-high multiparty system. The variable 
of polarization also decreased to 0.123, with 
fragmentation that remained in the vicinity 
of 0.8. 
In the second dimension, party finance 
and staffing were analyzed. In this context, 
there is no pretention to explain the details of 
the parties’ financial and staffing processes in 
terms of the nominal amount of their financial 
statements. This was decided due to limited 
access to reliable data. In addition, the Election 
Commission (KPU) and Finance Inspection 
Board (BPK) were currently carrying out 
reporting and financial audit. As a result, only 
Gerindra submitted financial audit reports 
for publication (Kompas, 16/04/2013). Party 
finance is an important issue in building party 
accountability. The general perspective that can 
be derived regarding the matter is that there 
has been significant change in party financing 
from the previous New Order government, 
due to the latter providing huge subsidies to 
political parties, especially to Golkar. Post-
reform, parties were required to seek their 
own sources of funding, since state subsidies 
were limited. Thus, parties typically relied 
on MPs and cadres holding public office at 
the executive level (Mietzner, 2007). From the 
assessment of regulations on party financing, 
party funding could come from members’ 
income, non-binding donations, and state 
subsidies, which are determined based on the 
number of seats in parliament. The Gerindra 
audit revealed that government subsidy funds 
are typically spent for political education of 
cadres and operational costs of the national 
secretariat (IDEA political finance report, 2012; 
Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia (BPK 
RI) Audit Report, 2010).
Based on the Transparency International 
Indonesia (TII Report, 2013) release (Table 3), 
only five parties completed the questionnaire, 
with four other parties providing incomplete 
data. Based on the data pertaining to these five 
parties, four provided financial information to 
the state report. In this case, the report was sent 
to the KPU for administrative requirements and 
the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia 
(BPK RI), in order to audit the state subsidy 
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funds provided to each party. However, all 
parties did not even provide mandatory 
information, as most of the information was 
incomplete and there was not even widespread 
publicity (Kompas, 12/03/2015). The report thus 
describes the general condition of the financial 
transparency of political parties in Indonesia. 
It is interesting to note that the Gerindra party 
had the highest score as they submitted the 
most transparent financial statements. In 
contrast, the Democrat Party emerged as the 
party that was uncooperative and did not allow 
public access to its financial budget.5
According to Thomas Reuter, the three 
models of party financing from private 
funding sources can be adopted in order 
to understand the financial conditions of a 
party. However, these models are difficult to 
detect, as funds are used directly to finance 
the election campaign. The first category 
of privately owned party refers to parties 
founded by the political elite in order to 
serve its political interests, as is the case with 
Gerindra, Nasdem and Hanura. The financing 
of these parties is often supported by private 
funds. The second category pertains to the 
party rental vehicle category which is used as 
5 There are nine parties that survey respondents referred 
to, namely the Democrat party, Golkar, PDIP, Gerindra, 
Hanura, PAN, PKB, PKS and PPP. In the survey, 
the Democratic Party and PKS were categorized as 
uncooperative, even though Golkar was the only party 
that did not cooperate.
a political vehicle of the ruling elite, such as 
Golkar. Party power holders use these funds 
to finance the organization of the party, for 
office functioning until election. The third 
category pertains to heritage parties, such as 
PDI-P’s use of political dynasty as a source of 
funding, namely the family of Taufik Kiemas, 
Megawati’s husband (Reuter, 2005).
How compact is each faction in parliament? 
It is important to ensure that the size of the 
parties’ influence in parliament is controlled 
through factions. This also reveals the extent 
of support for the executive government in 
parliament. Although voting was introduced 
in the House of Representatives in 2004, there 
are no official records accessible relating to the 
number of decisions taken by voting. The House 
was divided by two types of voting, the voting 
commission was followed by members of the 
commission for the election of executive officers 
in accordance with the commission’s work, and 
the parliamentary voting was followed by all 
MPs. The final voting made decisions regarding 
important issues, such as the Constitution Act and 
other matters related to the issue of parliament 
responsibility. In the analysis of the cohesiveness 
of the party, the Agreement Index (AI) and Rice 
Index (RI) are used to calculate the degree of party 
cohesiveness. 
In table 4, the AI is calculated, wherein Yi 
denotes the number of “Yes” votes expressed 
by group i on a given vote, Ni is the number of 
Table 3. 
Transparency Index by Parties4
Party
Information 
(mandatory to 
provide)
Information 
(mandatory 
to publish)
Information 
(mandatory reporting 
to the state)
Overall Score
Gerindra 3.50 3.88 4.00 3.74
PAN 3.47 3.50 4.00 3.64
PDI-P 3.67 1.00 4.00 3.10
Hanura 2.14 1.00 4.00 2.41
PKB 2.13 1.00 3.67 2.31
Notes:  1 = no information, 2 = incomplete information <50 percent, 3 = incomplete 
information >50 percent, 4 = complete information. 
Source: Transparency International Indonesia, 2013
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“No” votes and Ai the number of “Abstained” 
votes. As a result, the AI equals 1 when all the 
members of a party vote together and equals 0 
when the members of a party are equally divided 
between all three of these voting options (Hix, 
Noury & Roland, 2005: 209-34 & 215-216). The 
AI has compatibility for choice of “Abstained” 
votes. I also conducted a calculation of Rice 
Index (RI) to provide a comparison of party 
cohesiveness conditions without including the 
“Abstained” variable. RI is calculated based on 
the proportion of the group’s reduced votes 
from majority and minority groups (Hazan, 
2013:67; Martin, Saalfeld and Strøm, 2014: 
223-24). I note that the Indonesian parliament 
in a coalition does not have a clear structure; 
hence, the basis for assessing the coalition 
is a coalition of parties in the Presidential 
nomination. Even in Parliament, the coalition 
could disintegrate. I show the RI for each sound 
faction in parliament in order to assess the level 
of cohesiveness of the AI and RI in each issue of 
the various sampled period in parliaments.
The variation of party cohesiveness 
is evident in every period of parliamentary 
work. With respect to the variable of the AI, an 
interesting question arises: why is the AI lower 
in the 2004-2009 period when compared to the 
subsequent period? This phenomenon was not 
caused by the type of issues raised during the 
voting because, in other periods, a very high 
AI is noted. The main cause for this outcome 
was the composition of the political forces in 
parliament, which was more heterogeneous 
with weak majority support to presidential 
powers. The major parties, such as PKB, PPP, 
and Golkar, became factions in parliament 
with a low level of group cohesiveness. In 
the case of Golkar, the ELaw 2009 voting data 
shows the cohesiveness of the lowest fraction. 
A crucial factor that can explain this finding 
is the internal situation at the time, which 
disintegrated following Wiranto’s failure in the 
2004 presidential election. All the while, Jusuf 
Kalla did not fully garner the support of Golkar 
MPs in parliament. As the majority party 
Table 4. 
Fraction Cohesiveness in Parliament
 Issues
 EVList 2009 ELaw 2009 NatBud 2013  Century Case 2013 SocOrg 2013 LocEl 2014
Fraction AI RI AI RI AI RI AI RI AI RI AI RI
Hanura     1 100 1 100 1 100 1 100
Gerindra 1 100 1 100 1 100 1 100
PKB 0.65 88.23 1 100 1 100 1 100 1 100 1 100
PPP 1 100 0.82 83.33 1 100 1 100 1 100 1 100
PAN 1 100 0 100 1 100 1 100 1 100 1 100
PKS 1 100 1 100 1 100 1 100 1 100 1 100
PDIP 1 100 1 100 1 100 1 100 1 100 1 100
Golkar 1 100 1 100 1 100 1 100 1 100 1 100
PG 1 100 0.72 83.33 1 100 1 100 1 100 0 73.81
BPD 1 100 0.5 60
PBR 1 100 1 100         
PDS 0 33.33 0 100
Mean 0.86 92.15 0.7 92.6 1 100 1 100 1 100 0.88 97.09
Notes: EVList: Electoral Voter List (Hak Angket Daftar Pemilih 2009), ELaw: Electoral Law (Peraturan 
Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang/Perpu Pemilu 2009), NatBud: National Budget on Oil 
Price (Perubahan atas UU Nomor 19/2012 tentang APBN 2013), SocOrg: Society Organization 
(Rancangan Undang-undang Organisasi Masyarakat 2013), LocEl: Local Election Rancangan 
Undang-Undang Pemilihan Kepala Daerah Langsung 2014).
Source: calculated by author from official meeting notes of DPR.
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that gained 21 percent of the vote in the 2004 
election, Golkar’s bargaining position against 
the Yudhoyono-Kalla administration was very 
high. The condition was different from the 2009-
2014 period, in which Golkar decided to join the 
Democratic Party and initiate a grand coalition 
in parliament. The impact of this decision is 
evident in the very high AI. In the current 2014-
2019 period, Golkar is experiencing similar 
issues as in 2004-2009, with AI = 0 and RI = 
73.81 percent. It should be noted that Golkar 
suffered a split in the 2014 presidential election 
wherein the faction of Chairman Aburizal 
Bakrie supported Prabowo-Hatta Rajasa, while 
the other faction led by Luhut Panjaitan voted 
for Joko Widodo-Kalla.
In the Indonesian parliament, the 
size of the AI and RI is not influenced by 
different perceptions of MPs and factions 
in view of policy issues that become the 
object of voting. The most dominant factor 
is the unresolved issues in the previous 
political events related to internal party 
support in the presidential election. Faction 
authority is dominant and decisions are 
rarely taken through voting. A faction can 
easily express party interest in accordance 
with the instructions of the party authority 
holder through horizontal intervention. 
Other parties, such as the Democratic Party, 
PDI-P, and Gerindra, have a very high 
degree of cohesiveness. In the three parties, 
the factions have a full representation to 
choose and implement strategies from policy 
debate to decision-making in parliament. 
This further proves that effective party 
control lies in the central leadership, which 
controls the party political agendas through 
factions in parliament. Several other factors 
that explain why MPs rarely have dissenting 
opinions from that of a fraction include the 
threat of sanctions imposed by the party 
leadership. In certain categories, having an 
opposing vote from the fraction could result 
in dismissal as a parliamentary member. As 
is widely known, the party leadership has 
the right to withdraw the party members 
from parliament for reasons of violating 
party discipline. In general, a presidential 
multiparty system, as is the case in Indonesia, 
could produce levels of party cohesion that 
are relatively high. In a sample of voting on 
important issues that was taken in this study, 
the lowest mean AI was 0.7 and the RI was 
92.6 percent. Notwithstanding the foregoing, 
the AI and RI values can vary if calculated 
based on groupings of factions within each 
issue that becomes the object of voting.
Finally,  based on the description 
regarding party dimensions, four important 
facts are considered noteworthy. Firstly, in 
the dimensions of the connection to party 
electorates, electoral volatility remains 
relatively high. Parties have failed in reforming 
stable infrastructure with strong political 
support. Consequently, the parties rely solely 
on the strength of the dominant leader for 
strengthening organizational capacity. Party 
organization managed to produce a more 
centralized organizational hierarchy that 
reinforces oligarchy within the party. Secondly, 
in terms of organizational development, 
the parties are not managed with proper 
managerial systems and they lack transparency. 
Moreover, in terms of party financing and 
structuring, organizations that demonstrate 
party accountability are not managed properly. 
The implications of using the party as political 
vehicle of the elites can be observed in these 
problems. Thirdly, the party dimension of 
performance, as measured by its performance 
in parliament, revealed differences in horizontal 
control of the party faction in parliament. 
In general, the level of party cohesiveness is 
high, with the exception of Golkar. Despite 
producing legislative products, this party is 
highly dependent on the performance of its 
members in parliament during each period. 
Other factors, such as political coalition, do 
not have much impact on productivity since 
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horizontal control of the party in government 
coalition parties has a relatively high degree 
of compactness.
Conclusion
Based on the explanation above, this 
study has shown at least three specific items: 
First, changes of electoral system in each 
election term only have an impact on the party 
success to gain votes, especially regulation on 
the percentage of electoral threshold. Basically, 
there is no evidence that party grouping is 
carried out grounded on ideological tendencies; 
and Secondly, electoral system change has 
significant impact on party volatility and has 
close relationship with ENPP. This is basically 
an indication that party votes are coming from 
floating voters that switch their vote of choice 
from one party to another in each election. 
Party votes instability is also caused by the 
low level of party identification which affect 
voters’ loyalty. Interestingly, the different 
point of ENPP in each election did not have 
direct impact on the factionalization within 
parliament. Polarization and fragmentation 
look more stable and the evidence is obviously 
pointed out by testing the voting in parliament 
with compactness measurement which shows 
higher degrees of RI and AI. Thirdly, electoral 
system change has no significant effect on 
party financing improvement as parties are still 
infected by lack of accountability and financial 
transparency. In quality, electoral system change 
in Indonesia during the democratic transition 
has no significant improvement on party 
accountability and was unsuccessful in creating 
simple and concise multiparty system as shown 
by ENPP point from four to five. Another 
impact is party volatility that remains high, 
indicating the failure of party identification 
at grassroots level. As an exception, faction 
compactness in parliament is relatively high 
although this is mainly caused by variable of 
centralism in the party line coordination and 
centric based leadership.  
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